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interpretation, statutes covering entire subjects, uniform laws, analogical
reasoning from legislation, violation of statutes as negligence per se, judicial
adaptation of common law to basic legislative changes, and the problem of
codification and restatement.
In choosing their materials for the book, the authors have drawn exten-
sively from treatises and law review articles as well as from cases, committee
reports and statutes. They seem to have chosen cases or reports, rather than
excerpts from articles, whenever satisfactory cases could be found. It would,
of course, be impossible to find cases dealing with many of the problems
covered in such a book. The selection of cases and materials is very good.
I think, however, that it would have been better if the authors had written
textual material on many of the topics rather than attempting to cover them
by excerpts from articles. When a series of small excerpts from articles is
used, continuity of thought is generally lacking, and one can seldom obtain
the full meaning from an excerpt taken out of context. The authors have done
an excellent job in editing the cases. Seldom have they found it necessary to
edit a4 case so severely as to excise its facts. If the facts of a case are omitted,
it is no longer a short story in itself, and often becomes an almost meaning-
less abstraction.
The book is patterned for a course of four semester hours. The authors
say in the preface that the course is given in the third year in their schools
and extends through the academic year. It seems preferable to me to give the
course in the second year. While the students will undoubtedly learn more
from the course if it is postponed until the third year, I think it should, be
taught earlier as a basis for other courses. Problems of statutory construc-
tion constantly arise in second and third year courses, and the student will
be much better prepared to cope with them if he has had a course in legislation.
Considering the novelty and magnitude of the task, the compilation of
this casebook represents a real contribution to legal education. With the help
of such men as Professors Reed and MacDonald, and others in this field, per-
haps some day we shall become as adept in teaching legislation as we are in
teaching the common law.
GEORGE W. STENGEL AssocIATE PROFESSOR Oil LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF '[IAMI
THE ROOSEVELT COURT. By C. Herman Pritchett. New York: Macmillan
Company, 1948. Pp. 314. $5.00.
UNTIL a decade ago the conservative role of the United States Supreme
Court was given universal credence. Two factors had served to emphasize
the traditional check and balance interpretation: the life tenure of federal
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justices permitted the enunciation of old political and economic doctrines
after they had been discarded by state and federal legislatures; and the domina-
tion of national politics by the Republican party after 1869 meant that most
judicial appointments before 1937 were made by presidents who looked with
suspicion upon any effort to enlarge the scope of federal power. Occasionally
a rebel justice left the philosophical fold of his benefactor, but this applied
as well to the appointees of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the
only presidents between Andrew Johnson and Franklin Roosevelt who re-
flecfed the change manifested in American life by the Grangers, Populists,
Progressives and the growing labor movement. Continuity of control by one
party delayed the legislative-judicial war which is always a potential in the
divided authority of American government.
Judicial crises have appeared when federal authority was assumed by a
new party with a platform and philosophy that contrasted sharply with the
old. Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln ushered in new eras-eras that proved to
be uncomfortable for the courts appointed by their predecessors. The renais-
sance of the Democratic party in 1932 and the so-called Roosevelt Revolution
which followed marked the beginning of similar antagonism and led to Roose-
velt's dramatic assault on the Court in 1937. Court packing as such failed;
but twelve years in office permitted the recalcitrant executive to create a
Court of his own choice. Between 1937 and 1943 Roosevelt named eight
associate justices and placed his stamp of approval upon Harlan Stone, a
Hoover appointee, by elevating him to the Chief Justiceship. Only Roberts
remained as the traditional voice of the past. The "revolution" had carried
the Court! Lawyers, political scientists and historians waited with mixed
emotion but sustained interest for the transformation that would follow. What
would a "liberal" Court do to constitutional law? How would such a Court
adjust to the conservative reaction that seemed to be apparent even before
Roosevelt's death?
The Supreme Court -as reconstituted and redirected by President Roose-
velt's appointees" now has a ten year history. Its legal commitments have
accumulated sufficiently to permit an examination and assessment of the
effect of the New Deal upon constitutional law and government. Comments
on the Court have been proiuse. Every major decision and the personality
of each justice have provoked theorizing. Nearly anything said about the
present Court commands attention but the book under discussion is to be
particularly recommended.
C. Herman Pritchett is a University of Chicago professor of political sci-
ence who for the past eight years has published annual analyses of disagreements
among the Supreme Court justices. The Roosevelt Court is a study of judicial
disagreement during the period 1937-47. One common assumption about the
Roosevelt justices is soon proved in error. It was expected that the process
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of selection would naturally produce men of similar political, economic and
judicial attitudes-that they would all be "yes-men" to their chief. The 1920's
and early 1930's had been a period of important dissents and shar )
division; it followed that a court named almost entirely by one man would
show nearly complete uniformity. Instead it has become "the most ununani-
mous court in history." Thirty of the 1944 decisions were 5-4; by 1946 64%
of the cases heard divided the bench. The Roosevelt Court, then, cannot be
discussed in terms of majority conclusions. Perhaps it cannot be treated as
"a court" at all. Pritchett's thesis is that it must be approached in terms of
patterns of disagreement. Majority decisions indicate the position taken by
concurring justices on a given issue; it is in dissent that the justices reveal
their peculiarities of judgment. When divisions repeatedly throw the same
groups of justices into combination with each other the author attributes this
to "some underlying differences of the gospel." The most important contribu-
tions of the book are its efforts to determine, from the opinions of each of the
individuals and factions, the guiding philosophy which prompted them.
The techniques of statistical analysis are used in order to determine the
ratio of dissent for each justice and" the extent to which coalitions have
formed. Included in the text are thirty-five tables and graphs which demon-
strate percentages of deviation for each judge in each court term, the frequency
of mutual dissents to be found for various combinations of justices, and the
record of each juror on such basic issues as economic regulations, civil liber-
ties, and state rights.
The existence of well-defined groups, referred to as left wing and right
wing, was clearly evident during the early period, but after 1941 a marked
decline was apparent in the cohesiveness of the Court. Apparently, Roosevelt
judges were congenial so long as a remnant of the older conservative Court
remained; but as the Court was "liberalized" and perhaps as the kind of
questions coming tip for review changed, early combinations were shaken.
Temporarily, blocs could be defined but sharp division lessened. Though the
Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge coalition was still visible in 1947 it had
lost its old consistency. Agreement between Black and Douglas, 100% from
1938-40, declined to 68% in 1946. On the right and the left "all the justices
have more in common with colleagues on the pther side of the Court, and
less in common with members of their own wing than was previously the
case." Extremes of agreement and disagreement have disappeared.
Since all of the Court has accepted the principles of federal regulation
inherent in the New Deal, the left wing has distinguished itself through a
more positive libertarian stand on civil liberties.
("Roberts had a curious record, the only liberties he considered worthy
of protection being those of evacuated Japanese, indicted Nazis and Nazi
sympathizers, and the Associated Press.")
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The Black-Douglas group shows considerable concern too for procedural
rights in criminal prosecutions. The opposition, led by Frankfurter and Jack-
son, places high value on the desirability of states retaining control of their
own standards of criminal prosecution.
One popular theory, developed by Schlesinger and others, explains the
division on the bench as one between those who would assume an active
role for the Court and those who would limit judicial interference whenever
a question might be called one of political judgment. Frankfurter adheres to
the Holnesian doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be used to
hobble state legislative decisions. In contrast, Murphy holds that "as a judge"
he has "no loftier duty or responsibility than to uphold spiritual freedom to
its furthest reaches." The activists then are committed to a rigid defense of
the Bill of Rights, their associates to a firm policy of self-denial even when they
concede personal disapproval of a statute under consideration. For an example,
Frankfurter would not have voted for the flag salute law had he been a mem-
ber of the Minersville School Board, but as a reviewing judge he insisted
upon respect for the political wisdom of the lowliest legislature. Pritchett
quarrels with this interpretation as incomplete; "for Black is respectful of the
legislative judgment-more so than Frankfurter-where economic matters
are involved. In the Richmond tax case and the Arizona train limit case, for
example, Black voted to uphold legislative actions which Frankfurter helped
to overturn . . . Frankfurter's views on legislative supremacy . . . have been
elicited mostly in civil liberties cases." Judicial decisions and judicial explana-
tions must be interpreted in terms of the competing values of personal
"gospels"! Legal fictions are developed by liberal as well as conservative
courts.
Why is the Roosevelt Court the most divided in history? First, there
is the danger of overstressing disagreement. The early "honeymoon period"
demonstrated that on many vital issues that had torn asunder the preceding
Court there was complete unanimity. The constitutionality of most federal
legislation can now be taken for granted. Major questions, basic to the New
Deal, were settled by the Court before most of the Roosevelt appointees had
arrived. Problems solved with mutual satisfaction do not reappear; the court
is now faced with the refinement of settled questions and the myriad varia-
tions of issues that arise out of them. Once regulatory statutes were accepted,
their application raised moot points that highlighted shades of difference
nbt apparent on the old judicial canvas of blacks and whites. The high per-
centage of difficult cases helps to explain disagreement among justices. The
present generation finds modern problems unparalleled in complexity-it
is the same with judges. Pritchett explains the judicial burden and certain
abrupt departure from precedent as products of the failure of earlier justices
to permit a gradual adaptation of the constitution to new circumstances.
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Evolutionary change was neglected for too long, and rapid change resulted in
a quick accumulation of legal questions.
However, condemnation of the old or the new is not the purpose of
The Roosevelt Court. The author's chief goal seems to be to demonstrate the
magic of his science of statistics. The value is obvious. It is useful to refer
to a chart and discover that Murphy voted 94% strong in behalf of civil
liberties and that Jackson's record is by contrast only 30% libertarian. On
some questions the judicial cleavage lends itself admirably to chart and diagram.
But diagraming is most effective when it points up sharp differences. Minor
variations in social and political outlook cannot be measured simply by count-
ing cases roughly classified as "pro-personal liberty" or "anti-government
agency."
It would be reasonable to demand the weighting of a major case which
involved a broad and fundamental principle. Classification in itself is subject
to scrutiny; an important case involves several issues; two justices dis-
senting to the opinion may do so for very different reasons. These objections
are not intended to debunk the values of "mere counting," but to question the
validity of those charts which demonstrate small variation and jumbled
patterns.
To return to those alignments that can be diagramed in sharp relief,
a few corrections in classification and the introduction of factor analysis
would probably not alter them materially. But it can be charged that where
cleavage is sharp it is also so apparent as to make a graph unnecessary. Even
the casual student of the Court is aware of Mr. Justice Murphy's strong
sentiments on the Bill of Rights. We may profit from a careful tabulation of
differences on the bench, but an explanation of those differences is far more
significant. Pritchett became so enchanted with the intricacies of his charts
that he neglected his original quest: "What it was in that case and the auto-
biographies of those justices that led them to disagree with the majority of the
Court on the issue there raised." The major part of the book is given to an
exhibition of disagreement. The conclusions and interpretations that followed
were disappointingly brief. The sensation is that of having labored through
a very elaborate and expertly developed mystery tale only to discover that
the master detective retires at the crucial moment and leaves the solution
of the crime up to the reader. This is particularly aggravating since the detec-
tive has revealed himself to be deucedly clever in the development of clues
and in incidental judgments handed down along the way.
It is, of course, ridiculous to censor Pritchett because he does not give a
definitive analysis of the Roosevelt Court. Fortunately or unfortunately,
constitutional history cannot be presented in the succinct form of a whodunit.
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But the cautious interpretations which are presented are so expertly handled
that their briefness will be a matter of chagrin to the serious student of the
Court.
Many more books will be written about the new Court; it is to be
hoped that Pritchett will write some of them.
EvE THOMAS INSTRUCTOR, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
SOVIET LEGAL THEORY, ITS SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT, By
Rudolf Schlesinger. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp.
299. $10.00.
THE serious gap between Soviet legal ideas and the philosophical ideas
implicit in Western jurisprudence is emphasized by the recent English edition
of A. Y. Vishinsky's The Law of the Soviet State (1948). Rudolf Schlesinger,
a non-Soviet scholar with a thorough knowledge both of Soviet law and its
sociological considerations, has framed a valuable and highly useful reference
for bridging the gap in his Soviet Legal Theory. By recounting the sociological
atmosphere of the U. S. S. R. in terms of the reality of Soviet law, Schlesinger
affords a striking vindication of J. L. Brierly's axiom that a merely juridical
explanation of any legal system will not suffice and that comprehension must
be sought outside the law itself.
Schematically, Soviet Legal Theory combines a positivist approach to
the special nature of Soviet law with a chronological treatment of Soviet so-
ciety since 1917. No attempt is made to conceal the rationalizations which
creep into Soviqt law to make it conform to the socio-economic pattern of
the era of the "second revolution" (1929-30) as distinguished from theoretical
conceptions in vogue during the period of war communism (1918-21), or
from the theoretical foundations of the Jaw in classical Marxism. Vishinsky,
who presents the official view on the legal aspects of the second revolution,
defends the illegality, in terms of previous Soviet law, of essential measures
carried through in the process of "de-kulakization" on the grounds that "the
interests of proletarian dictatorship were superior to its own laws and that
the solution of the problems of revolutionary transition within the framework
of any fixed legal system was impossible." The inevitability of having to pro-
nounce such mystifying statements as this is apparent when Schlesinger re-
veals the rejection by the prominent Soviet theorist, Pashukanis, of his own
earlier explanation of law as an essentially bourgeois institution based on the
phenomenon of "commcdity exchange" and bound to wither away as social-
ism was achieved. The "commodity exchange" thesis was that the possessors of
